Реферат: Consolidation Of Democracy In PostSoviet Russia Essay

was forced to resign in disgrace from the Moscow party leadership in 1987 and from the Politburo in

1988. His Lazarus act is well documented. Just as well documented his tendency to become a political

chameleon, changing his colors to suit any political condition. He has been a communist boss, a reformer

within the communist system, a liberal slayer of communism and a nationalist warrior against

secessionism (Shevstova 69). While the American president may wear many hats, Yeltsin has traded in

his entire wardrobe numerous times over. He is truly a skilled political in-fighter, maneuvers he learned

from his Communist political education.

Lilia Shevstova is ardently critical of the decisions Yeltsin has made in the post-Soviet era. She lays

much of the responsibility for the politics of confrontation squarely at the feet of Yeltsin and his advisors

(Shevstova 58).

First, she debunks the idea that Yeltsin is a ?destroyer of the old system. Correctly, she considers him a

reformer who has not attempted to address the institutional hegemony held by the former nomenklatura .

His policies have resulted in the concentration of political and economic power in the hands of the former

communist elites. And she lists a number of Soviet era tactics, such as playing the members of

nomenklatura against one another, that still personify Yeltsin decision making (Shevstova 60). Yeltsin

still digs deep into his Communist bag of tricks when trying to consolidate his power.

The Presidential Revolution of 1993 signified a turn towards a more personalistic brand of rule for Russia.

Shevstova argues, and I would agree, that the Constitutional Crisis of 1993 was largely predicated on

Yeltsin attempting to outmaneuver his old Communist rivals, who had taken refuge in the legislature

(Shevstova 62). The supporters that Yeltsin lined up behind him for this insurgency upon the Supreme

Soviet were wildly divergent in their political orientations and goals. They included liberal reformers,

bureaucrats and pragmatists, statists and security officials, and extreme nationalists (Shevstova 63). This

motley crew testifies to the bizarre landscape that makes up Russian politics.

Yet it is that bizarre political landscape that Yeltsin appears to be most comfortable operating upon.

Yeltsin can consolidate and maintain authority because of the lingering sense of crisis that hangs over

Russian politics (Shevstova 65). The widely held belief that a successor would be a worse option and an

absence of any real alternatives has allowed Yeltsin to maneuver with impunity. The June presidential

elections present a clear example of this phenomenon. Even with horrendous economic and political

performance, Yeltsin still was able to defeat Zhyguanov, for the reason that the challenger was the pits, a