Реферат: East Timor Independence

While a group of conservatives were granted support by traditional chiefs and administrators -- whose positions and privileges under Portuguese rule made them emphasize a continuation with the metropolis --, those with commercial preoccupations of economical diversification beyond the Portuguese orbit focused on the advantages of independence.

Not until 27 of July did the MFA in Lisbon determine the new orientation in relation with the colonial territories. By it, the Timorese were officially and for the first time confronted with the possibility of independence.

In a message to the Portuguese President, UDT still inquired about the viability of federation, but no further elucidation was obtained. Few days later, UDT published the provisional statutes where preconized autodetermination oriented to federation with Portugal, with an intermediate phase for obtention of independence, and rejecting integration in any potential foreign country. It is probable that the discouragement of a definite bind with Portugal had also to do with the winds of independence that blew from the ancient metropolis. Spreading throughout the African colonies, in East Timor it influenced a crescent opposing party of independist militancy that defied UDT's hesitations: ASDT.

Amongst UDT founders pontificated the mentioned Mario Carrascalгo, proprietor of coffee plantations, director of the Agriculture Services, and also former leader of caetanist party ANP (Popular National Association), the only one allowed. Ex-seminarist Lopes da Cruz was too a ANP member and director of Timor's journal, A Voz de Timor, patronized by the government. He and intellectual Domingos de Oliveira were custom officials. Cesar Mouzinho was Mayor of Dili.

ASDT/Fretilin (Revolutionary Front of Independent East Timor). The plan of ASDT was acknowledged in the proper day of it's foundation, 20th of May. Adopting the doctrines of socialism and democracy it called upfront for a gradual independence preceded of administrator, economical, social and political reforms. Three to eight years was the period of transition considered necessary. And from the beginning with the participation of the Timorese in the administration.

In the majority, ASDT was constituted with recent recruited members of the urbane elites, mainly those living in Dнli, which maintained the link to the rural areas of where they came from. Some were even descendants of liurai families.

With an average age under 30, the elder Xavier do Amaral, of 37, became ASDT's chairman. The leaders were commited to nationalism and reaffirmation of the Timorese culture, agreed on the priority of agricultural development, on alphabetization and extensive health programmes. But furthermore, the political perspectives deferred. The dominating tendency between the founders of ASDT was clearly social-democratic, represented by men like journalist Ramos-Horta, administrator Alarico Fernandes, Justino Mota and former professor Xavier do Amaral. Ramos-Horta says that for him and the majority of his colleagues it represented social justice, equitative distribution of the country's wealth, a mixed economy and a parliamentary system with extended democratic liberties. As to what extent did they have a model, sociologist John G. Taylor mentions the social-democracy of the 60 and 70's in Austria and Scandinavia. Anyway it wasn't experimented, as the urgency to gain internal and foreign support seems to have kept on depriving the opportunity.

Still during the ASDT period, a secondary current leaded by ancient sergeant and administrator, also ex-seminarist, Nicolau Lobato, “combined a fervent anticolonial nationalism with notions of economical and political development self-reliance based upon the experiences of Angola and Mozambique”. His ideas would begin to prevail after the transformation of ASDT into FRETILIN.

Apodeti (Timorese Popular Democratic Association). In 25 of May a third party appeared under the designation of Association for the Integration of Timor in Indonesia. Renamed Apodeti, the manifesto of the party defended an integration with autonomy in the Republic of Indonesia in accordance to the International Law and principles such as the obligatory teaching of the Indonesian language (Indonesian Bahasa), free education and medical assistance, and the right to go on strike.

The visionaries of Apodeti parted from the assumption that Portugal would abandon East Timor and that the idea of independence couldn't stand a chance because of Indonesia. In reality, the revindication of autonomy in a process of integration appeared more as a popular measure and than as a political stand.

It has been written that in the beginning of the 60's, BAKIN (military co-ordinator agency of the secret intelligence INTEL), mounted a net in East Timor which dealed with merchants, custom-house functionaries and agents from the Indonesian consulate of Dili, in change of favours, payments and refuge in case of conflict. Among them, those who would become the prominent leaders of Apodeti: professor and administrator Osуrio Soares, liurai of Atsabe (near the boarder of Indonesian Timor) Guilherme Gonzalves, and cattle breeder Arnaldo dos Reis Arajo.

Still before the Portuguese Revolution, BAKIN had trained East-timoreses in radio transmissions and as interpreters.

Nevertheless, while UDT and ASDT/Fretilin rapidly reached to the thousands of adepts, Apodeti wouldn't reach more than a couple of hundreds during the whole year of '74.

The support came mainly from the sucos of Guilherme Atsabe and a small Muslim community of Dili. Besides this it had no expression. The dubious personalities of it's leaders, all with criminal record and their political purposes made Apodeti in the words of East Timor's last governor, J. Lemos Pires “an enclosed organization, with difficulties to dialogue with the people and government even worse with the opponent parties”. Fretilin considered Apodeti illegal.

Three minor parties appeared, all more or less insignificant. The KOTA (Klibur Oan Timur Aswain), meaning "sons of the mountain warriors", was filiated in the Popular Monarchical Party of the metropolis. Remounting it's origins to the Topasses (see Ethnology of the Timorese), KOTA postulated the restoration of powers to the liurais who could trace their ancestrality back to the Topasse period in order to constitute a democratic monarchy, with the king to be elected amongst the liurais. Like KOTA, the Timorese Democratic Labour Movement hadn't a programme and agrouped only eight members, all from the same family. They wished to mobilize the working class. The Democratic Association for the integration of East Timor in Australia received money for promises of integration in Australia. It's existence was ephemerous because the Australian government departed from the idea even before the end of 1974.

Of these parties, KOTA and the Labour party were further mentioned and precisely by the Indonesian authorities with the sole purpose to evoke that four of the five parties, which they alleged that was the majority of the East-timorese, had petitioned for integration during the Civil War

On 15 September the United Nations Security Council unanimously authorised the establishment of a multinational force in Timor (UNSCR 1264). The resolution gives the force three tasks for its mandate: first, to restore peace and security to East Timor; second to protect and support the United Nations Mission in East Timor and; third, to facilitate within force capabilities humanitarian assistance operations in East Timor. The multinational force is commanded by Australia’s Major General Peter Cosgrove

Australian support

The multinational force has been authorised by the United Nations Security Council, under chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, to use all necessary measures to achieve its mandate. The multinational force would prepare the ground for the United Nations to complete its task of managing East Timor's transition to independence. This will involve the arrival as soon as possible of a fully-fledged blue helmet UN peacekeeping operation and the establishment of a UN transitional administration.

Australian support for peacekeeping operations is not something new – Bougainville is but one ongoing example. But the East Timor operation – multilateral in scope, strongly representing South East Asia, led by Australia and conducted under a United Nations Chapter VII or peace enforcement mandate – is of a very different nature. This is the first time that Australia has been asked by the United Nations to build and lead a multinational force and to provide the largest single component. When Australia’s deployment was at full strength, it had committed 4,500 troops.

Australian involvement in the East Timor crisis is not motivated by any desire to cause difficulties in relations between Australia and Indonesia. It is important that Australia is in East Timor at the request of the United Nations and with the agreement of the Indonesian Government. It was in Australia’s vital interests that Indonesia be a peaceful, stable and democratic state, economically prosperous and playing a leading and respected role in the region. It was also in Indonesia’s own interests to ensure East Timor’s transition is a peaceful and orderly one. Australia’s efforts in building the relations with Indonesia were directed to that outcome.

With respect to defence relations, it is in australian security interests to have links such as defence attache representation, high-level strategic talks, staff college courses, maritime surveillance and disaster relief exercises. Such contacts are necessary to achieve the objectives in East Timor, and are desirable because defence links will be part of any effective long-term relationship with Indonesia. That decision shows the challenges Jakarta and Canberra face in maintaining a working defence relationship that supports the long-term national and strategic interests of both countries.

Prime Minister Howard has said that “the deployment of Australian troops to East Timor meets the test of national interest in two respects. First, in the spirit of Australia's military tradition, troops are going to defend what Australian society believes to be right. The troops are not going to occupy territory, to impose the will of Australia on others or to act against the legitimate interests of another country. Rather, they go to East Timor at the request of the United Nations and with the agreement of the Indonesian government. INTERFET troops are defending East Timor’s desire for independence, as delivered in a free vote granted to them by the Indonesian Government and with the blessing of the international community. In addition, INTERFET troops will facilitate the humanitarian relief that is so desperately needed for the hundreds of thousands of displaced people in East Timor.

Second, Australian troops in East Timor will work to put an end to the terrible violence that prevailed immediately after the result of the ballot was announced. Apart from the human cost, the scale of violence we witnessed undermines Australia's own interest in a stable region. The troops will prepare the way for the United Nations to undertake the vital task of developing a transitional political and administrative framework for East Timor. For East Timorese, this offers the hope of reconciliation among groups that have fought each other for decades and the opportunity to create their own future. They have a responsibility to come to grips with these issues. For Indonesia, it will more readily be able to concentrate on its nation building task, with the full support of the international community.”

USA admits Timorese right to self-determination

On a letter to Senator Russel Feingold, dated December 27th, 1996, U.S. President Bill Clinton recognized, for the first time, that he "noted with interest your [a group of 15 U.S. Senators] support of a UN-sponsored self-determination referendum in East Timor".

Indonesia admits independence

For the first time in 23 years, Indonesia has admitted the right of the Timorese people to indepence. Last January, on the eve of another high-level bilateral summit on East Timor between the Portuguese and Indonesian Foreign Ministers, at the United Nations' headquarters in New Yourk, the Indonesian authorities stated that if the East Timorese rejected the current authonomy plan offered by Indonesia, the central government in Jakarta would be ready to let them separate from their invadors.

Only a couple of weeks later, president B.J. Habibie announced, at a meeting with indonesian businessmen at the Chamber of Commerce, that by January 1st, 2000 the problem of East Timor would be 'fixed': either the Timorese accepted the "large-scale authonomy" proposed by the Indonesian government in New York (August 5th, 1998), or Indonesia "would wave them goodbye". It was the first time the Indonesian authorities openly talked of independence for East Timor.

Meanwhile, the situation on the territory has worsened in the last months, followin the alleged massacre at Alas (south of Dili) last December, when as much as 52 people would have been killed. The military (18,000 soldiers currently serve in the occupied territory, according to intelligence data smuggled out of East Timor by a dicident officer - that is, 1 for each 40 East Timorese, or proportionally 7 times more than in the rest of Indonesia) have been arming civilian militia, in what international observers consider to be a move aimed at starting a civil war on the verge of Indonesia's leave.

Agreement Between the Republic of Indonesia and the Portugese Republic on the Question of East Timor

The Governments of Indonesia and Portugal, recalling General Assembly resolutions and the relevant resolutions and decisions adopted by the Security Council and the General Assembly on the question of East Timor; bearing in mind the sustained efforts of the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal since July 1983, through the good offices of the Secretary-General, to find a just, comprehensive and internationally acceptable solution to the question of East Timor; recalling the agreement of 5 August 1998 to undertake, under the auspices of the Secretary-General, negotiations on a special status based on a wide-ranging autonomy for East Timor without prejudice to the positions of principle of the respective Governments on the final status of East Timor; having discussed a constitutional framework for an autonomy for East Timor on the basis of a draft presented by the United Nations, as amended by the Indonesian Government; noting the position of the Government of Indonesia that the proposed special autonomy should be implemented only as an end solution to the question of East Timor with full recognition of Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor; noting the position of the Government of Portugal that an autonomy regime should be transitional, not requiring recognition of Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor or the removal of East Timor from the list of Non-Self-Governing Territories of the General Assembly, pending a final decision on the status of East Timor by the East Timorese people through an act of self-determination under United Notions auspices; taking into account that although the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal each have their positions of principle on the prepared proposal for special autonomy, both agree that it is essential to move the peace process forward, and that therefore, the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal agree that the Secretary-General should consult the East Timorese people on the constitutional framework for autonomy attached hereto as an annex; bearing in mind that the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal requested the Secretary-General to devise the method and procedures for the popular consultation through a direct, secret and universal ballot signed up in New York on this 5th day of May, 1999 the Agreement Between the Republic of Indonesia and the Portugese Republic on the Question of East Timor

“Article 1 Request the Secretary-General to put the attached proposed constitutional framework providing for a special autonomy for East Timor within the unitary Republic of Indonesia to the East Timorese people, both inside and outside East Timor, for their consideration and acceptance or rejection through a popular consultation on the basis of a direct, secret and universal ballot.