Топик: EPISTEMOLOGY AND METHODOLOGY: MAIN TRENDS AND ENDS. (Эпистемология и Методология)

The second problem also involves seeing but in a somewhat unusual way. It deals with that which one cannot see, namely the mind of another. Suppose a woman is scheduled to have an operation on her right knee and her surgeon tells her that when she wakes up she will feel a sharp pain in her knee. When she wakes up, she does feel the pain the surgeon alluded to. He can hear her groaning and see certain contortions on her face. But he cannot feel what she is feeling. There is thus a sense in which he cannot know what she knows. What he claims to know, he knows because of what others who have undergone operations tell him they have experienced. But, unless he has had a similar operation, he cannot know what it is that she feels.

Indeed, the situation is still more complicated; for, even if the doctor has had such a surgical intervention, he cannot know that what he is feeling after his operation is exactly the same sensation that the woman is feeling. Because each person's sensation is private, the surgeon cannot really know that what the woman is describing as a pain and what he is describing as a pain are really the same thing. For all he knows, she could be referring to a sensation that is wholly different from the one to which he is alluding.

In short, though another person can perceive the physical manifestations the woman exhibits, such as facial grimaces and various sorts of behaviour, it seems that only she can have knowledge of the contents of her mind. If this assessment of the situation is correct, it follows that it is impossible for one person to know what is going on in another person's mind. One can conjecture that a person is experiencing a certain sensation, but one cannot, in a strict sense of the term, know it to be the case.

If this analysis is correct, one can conclude that each human being is inevitably and even in principle cut off from having knowledge of the mind of another. Most people, conditioned by the great advances of modern technology, believe that in principle there is nothing in the world of fact about which science cannot obtain knowledge. But the "other-minds problem" suggests the contrary--namely, that there is a whole domain of private human experience that is resistant to any sort of external inquiry. Thus, one is faced with a profound puzzle, one of whose implications is that there can never be a science of the human mind.

Implications.

These two problems resemble each other in certain ways and differ in others, but both have important implications for epistemology.

First, as the divergent perceptions about the stick indicate, things cannot just be, as they appear to be. People believe that the stick, which looks bent when it is in the water, is really straight, and they also believe that the stick, which looks straight when it is out of the water, is really straight. But, if the belief that the stick in water is really straight is correct, then it follows that the perception human beings have when they see the stick in water cannot be correct. That particular perception is misleading with respect to the real shape of the stick. Hence, one has to conclude that things are not always, as they appear to be.

It is possible to derive a similar conclusion with respect to the mind of another. A person can exhibit all the signs of being in pain, but he may not be. He may be pretending. On the basis of what can be observed, it cannot be known with certitude that he is or that he is not in pain. The way he appears to be may be misleading with respect to the way he actually is. Once again vision can be misleading.

Both problems thus force one to distinguish between the way things appear and the way they really are. This is the famous philosophical distinction between appearance and reality. But, once that distinction is drawn, profound difficulties arise about how to distinguish reality from mere appearance. As will be shown, innumerable theories have been presented by philosophers attempting to answer this question since time immemorial.

Second, there is the question of what is meant by "knowledge." People claim to know that the stick is really straight even when it is half-submerged in water. But, as indicated earlier, if this claim is correct, then knowledge cannot simply be identical with perception. For whatever theory about the nature of knowledge one develops, the theory cannot have as a consequence that knowing something to be the case can sometimes be mistaken or misleading.

Third, even if knowledge is not simply to be identified with perception, there nevertheless must be some important relationship between knowledge and perception. After all, how could one know that the stick is really straight unless under some conditions it looked straight? And sometimes a person who is in pain exhibits that pain by his behaviour; thus there are conditions that genuinely involve the behaviour of pain. But what are those conditions? It seems evident that the knowledge that a stick is straight or that one is in great pain must come from what is seen in certain circumstances: perception must somehow be a fundamental element in the knowledge human beings have. It is evident that one needs a theory to explain what the relationship is--and a theory of this sort, as the history of the subject all too well indicates, is extraordinarily difficult to develop.

The two problems also differ in certain respects. The problem of man's knowledge of the external world raises a unique difficulty that some of the best philosophical minds of the 20th century (among them, Bertrand Russell, H.H. Price, C.D. Broad, and G.E. Moore) spent their careers trying to solve. The perplexity arises with respect to the status of the entity one sees when one sees a bent stick in water. In such a case, there exists an entity--a bent stick in water--that one perceives and that appears to be exactly where the genuinely straight stick is. But clearly it cannot be; for the entity that exists exactly where the straight stick is is the stick itself, an entity that is not bent. Thus, the question arises as to what kind of a thing this bent-stick-in-water is and where it exists.

The responses to these questions have been innumerable, and nearly all of them raise further difficulties. Some theorists have denied that what one sees in such a case is an existent entity at all but have found it difficult to explain why one seems to see such an entity. Still others have suggested that the image seen in such a case is in one's mind and not really in space. But then what is it for something to be in one's mind, where in the mind is it, and why, if it is in the mind, does it appear to be "out there," in space where the stick is? And above all, how does one decide these questions? The various questions posed above only suggest the vast network of difficulties, and in order to straighten out its tangles it becomes indispensable to develop theories.

Methodology.

In accordance with a proposal made above, epistemology, or the logic of scientific discovery, -should be identified with the theory of scientific method. The theory of method, in so far as it goes beyond the purely logical analysis of the relations between scientific statements, is concerned with the choice of methods with decisions about the way in which scientific statements are to be dealt with. These decisions will of course depend in their turn upon the aim, which we choose from among a number of possible aims.

Methodology or a scientific method is a collective term denoting the various processes by the aid of which the sciences are built up. In a wide sense, any mode of investigation by which scientific or other impartial and systematic knowledge is acquired is called a scientific method.

What are the rules of scientific method, and why do we need them? Can there be a theory of such rules, a methodology? The way in which one answers these questions will largely depend upon one’s attitude to science. The way in which one answers these questions will largely depend upon one's attitude to science. Those who, like the positivists, see empirical science as a system of statements, which satisfy certain logical criteria, such as meaningfulness or verifiability, will give one-answer. A very different answer will be given by those who tend to see the distinguishing characteristic of empirical statements in their susceptibility to revision—in the fact that they can be criticised,-and superseded by better ones; and who regard it as their task to analyse the characteristic ability of science to advance, and the characteristic manner in which a choice is made, in crucial cases, between conflicting systems of theories.

Such methods, as it was mentioned above, are of two principal types— technical and logical . A technical or technological method is a method of manipulating the phenomena under investigation, measuring them with precision, and determining the conditions under which they occur, so as to be able to observe them in a favourable and fruitful manner. A logical method is a method of reasoning about the phenomena investigated, a method of drawing inferences from the conditions under which they occur, so as to interpret them as accurately as possible. The term "scientific method" in the first instance probably suggests to most minds the technical methods of manipulation and measurement. These technical methods are very numerous and they are different in the different sciences. Few men ever master the technical methods of more than one science or one group of closely connected sciences. An account of the most important technical methods is usually given in connection with the several sciences. It would be impossible, even if it were desirable, to give a useful survey of all, or even of the most important, technical methods of science. It is different with the logical methods of science. These methods of reasoning from the available evidence are not really numerous, and are essentially the same in all the sciences. It is both possible and desirable to survey them in outline. Moreover, these logical methods of science are in a very real sense the soul of the technical methods.

In pure science the technical methods are not regarded as an end in themselves, but merely as a means to the discovery of the nature of the phenomena under investigation. This is done by drawing conclusions from the observations and experiments, which the technical methods render possible. Sometimes the technical methods make it possible for the expert investigator to observe and measure certain phenomena, which otherwise could either not be observed and measured at all, or not so accurately. Sometimes they enable him so to determine the conditions of their occurrence that he can draw reliable conclusions about them, instead of hav­ing to be content with unverified conjectures. The highly specu­lative, mainly conjectural character of early science was no doubt due entirely to the lack of suitable technical methods and scientific instruments. In a sense; therefore, it may be said that the techni­cal methods of science are auxiliary to the logical methods, or methods of reasoning. And it is these methods that are to be con­sidered in the present article. The technical methods of science, as ought to be clear from the preceding remarks, are of first rate importance, 'and we have not the remotest desire to underrate them; but it would be futile to attempt to survey them here.

Some Mental Activities Common to All Methods.

There are certain mental activities, which are so absolutely indispensable to science that they are practically always employed in scientific investigations, however much these may vary in other respects. In a wide sense these mental activities might consequently be called methods of science, and they are frequently so called. But this practice is objectionable, because it leads to cross division and confusion. What is common to all methods should not itself be called a method, for it only encourages the effacing of important differences; and when there are many such factors common to all the methods, or most of them, confusion is inevitable. When the mental activities involved are more or less common to the methods, these must be differentiated by reference to other, variable factors—such as the different types of data from which the inferences are drawn, and the different types of order sought or discovered in the different kinds, of phenomena investigated— the two sets of differences being, of course, intimately connected. The mental activities referred to are the following: Observation (including experiment), analysis and synthesis, imagination, sup­position and idealisation, inference (inductive and deductive), and comparison (including analogy). A few words must be said about each of these; but no significance should be attached to the order in which they are dealt with.

Observation and Experiment.

Observation is the act of apprehending things and events, their attributes and their con­crete relationships. From the point of view of scientific interest two types of observation may be distinguished, namely: (1) The bare observation of phenomena under conditions which are beyond the control of the investigator, and (2) experiment, that is, the observation of phenomena under conditions controlled by the in­vestigator. What distinguishes experiment from bare observation is control over what is observed, not the use of scientific apparatus, nor the amount of trouble taken. The mere use of telescopes or microscopes, etc., even the selection of specially suitable times and places of observation, does not constitute an experiment, if there is no control over the phenomenon observed. On the other hand, where there is such control, there is experiment, even if next to no apparatus be used, and the amount of trouble involved be negligible. The making of experiments usually demands the employment of technical methods, but the main interest centres in the observations made possible thereby. The great advantage of experiment over bare observation is that it renders possible a more reliable analysis of complex phenomena, and more reliable inferences about their connections, by the variation of circum­stances, which it effects. Its importance is so great that people commonly speak of "experimental method." The objection to this is that experiment may be, and is, used in connection with various methods, which are differentiated on other, and more legitimate, grounds. To speak of a method of observation is even less permissible, seeing that no method can be employed without it.

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